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After the destruction of the centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe, 
the governments that came into power tried to create new institutions able to 
adapt to the needs of the new era and the demands of the neoliberal economy, 
the dominant ideology of our times. Besides, for these new States, the possibility 
of financial aid depended on the implementation of the demands of the 
international organizations, which finance the newly funded societies, like the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). On the other hand, these countries had 
to leave the single-party political system, in which the Communist party was 
predominant, and try to implement conditions of pluralistic civil democracy.
In many cases, these efforts have a dramatic effect on the social conditions: 
unemployment, which was previously hidden, increased quickly, 1 inflation, which 
at the beginning followed quite often radical changes, finally decrease of the 
standard of living, which in most cases was already low. At the same time, the 
end of government aid to the households turned things into worse. A quite 
striking element is, as Deacon pin-points, that up to  1992 the old government 
mechanism regulated price changes with decrees, and at the same time 
compensated substantial parts of the population for the consequences that 
1. Deacon, 1996, p. 293.
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were created by such increases. 2 There is no in-depth analysis by social scientists 
for the change and overthrow of the old state mechanism after the velvet 
revolution of 1989. The old state mechanism seems to regulate the new era and 
the transition of these societies into the market economy, the only one to end 
up in prison is the Secretary General of the communist party in East Germany, 
Erich Honecker.
On these grounds, we are studying the reduction of State control that occurred 
in these countries and the new hopes that came from neoliberals for the speed 
up process towards the market economy along with the fans of the so-called 
actually existing socialism for the final outcome of the transition process towards 
capitalism, 3 with a growing interest for the problems and perspective of the 
transition in the whole Balkan societies. 4
The rhetoric of change after 1989
After 1989, several Western philosophers like Samuel Huntington tried to explain 
the process of instability in the Balkans and to justify military intervention. 
According to them, the hostilities were attributed to a kind of inherited hatred 
between the Balkan peoples, predetermined to be in continuous conflict because 
of their cultural divisions. 5 It is clear that the conflict of civilizations theory, as 
philosophy, goes through and in depth every aspect of liberal western thought, in 
order to justify any intervention in sensitive areas such as the Balkans.
Clearly the nationalistic reasoning goes through the conscience of the Balkan 
populations but it doesn’t involve the exclusive privilege of the countries of 
Southeast Europe. Nationalistic conflicts and unrest appear in many areas in the 
planet, like Africa, Asia, even in Europe, for example the struggle of the Basques, 
the effort for administrative autonomy in Catalonia, even the guerilla army of 
the IRA and generally where minorities exist. In an account of the war in the 
Balkans, we see that these wars are identified either as “unthinkable” or described 
as “balkanic butchery”, and lead us to the conclusion that we have to do with a 
doubtful peninsula which is not yet European! 6
2. Ibid, p. 307.
3. Fotopoulos, 1993, p. 39.
4. For the main lines of the Balkan historical background and the new post-1990 
conditions, see in French, Cattaruzza & Sintès, 2012.
5. Goldsworthy, 2002, p. 26.
6. Ibid., p. 29
THE TRANSITION OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES...
Miltiades KIPAS 231
A closer study is needed so as to completely understand the phenomena 
that are predominant after 1989, a study which will explain the co-existence of 
different nationalities, and at the same time, understand to what extend democracy 
prevailed in these countries. Bulgaria, Romania and Albania along with the 
biggest part of former Yugoslavia constitute the southeastern European Balkans. 
It is clear that the culmination of democracy has faced there long-term obstacles 
greater than those faced in Central and Eastern Europe. Foreign attacks stopped 
the development of institutions, except for the Christian orthodox church, and 
at the same time retarded the growth of a western development plan for private 
liberty. 7
Long-term Turkish subjection and subsequent wars between the Ottoman 
Empire and the Opposite powers, have caused many populations shifts, 
“voluntary” or not. The complex coexistence of languages and religions, even that 
of “minorities”, means that the Balkans is a compound ethnic mosaic that creates 
great difficulties to any government that tries to keep in power and balance any 
political system and society based on the Nation-State ideal. The first contact with 
the democratic regime was unsuccessful, and started prior or immediately after 
World War i.
It was difficult for the weak Balkan states to unite their populations, different 
as to their national feelings, and who faced intense financial and economic 
inequalities. 8 No domestically trade-oriented middle class could be committed 
so as to establish political institutions and the law seemed to serve as a fortress for 
democratic governments.
At any rate the prewar failure isn’t only attributed to non-promising 
conditions, to unfit leaders or to socioeconomic impoverishment. It is clear that 
there were deeper reasons having a greater impact in the region as it is proved 
today, 60  years later. Traditions concerning individual freedom were weak. 9 
Freedom actually meant freedom concerning the choice of foreign influence and 
not exactly freedom of the right of individual as such as to express disagreement 
on government positions or disagreement from the opinion of the majority. Many 
citizens either ignored the existence of their rights, or even were afraid to practice 
them. 10
7. Gallagher, 1998, p. 43.
8. Ibid., p. 43.
9. Ibid., p. 44.
10. Ibid., p. 44
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According to Miall, a traditional anarchic state system still exists in the 
Balkans, which predetermines the issue of power in the relationship between 
States. 11 The same could also apply for Central Europe, for example in 
Czechoslovakia where two different States were formed, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic. In Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia the issue of the Magyar 
community has to be solved as well. Nonetheless, the “nations mosaic” rationale 
cannot at any rate constitute an alibi so as to explain wild wars and thus adopt 
a racist belief based on the difference of civilization and culture. At any rate the 
issues of the prerogatives of the minority constitute major international concern 
and are not a simple internal political problem. 12
Furthermore, the situation doesn’t justify the vulgarity or the zeal that the 
West showed over the bombarding of Yugoslavia. The NATO bombarding of 
Yugoslavia aimed first at beleaguering its defense, and second destructing its 
industrial and economic infrastructure. 13 Also, we must never forget that the 
South-East Europe geographically is at the edge of Europe and is directly related 
to the cultural traditions of two more states, Romania and Bulgaria newly entered 
in Europe. Besides the country with the greatest minority problem is Turkey, 
which after the 1920’s didn’t face any problems of the “balkanic butchery” type 
(except the Kurdish question!), despite the abolition or limitation of personal 
individual rights and the perpetration of atrocities at times. It is clear that with 
its geopolitical position and its usefulness in the Middle  East, the countries of 
developed capitalism had to manage Turkey in a different way. Maybe, because 
of the Balkans’ geographical position in the geopolitical map, fragmentation and 
unrest contribute to certain solutions in favor of the interest of the West.
Political and social challenges
We have already mentioned the nationalistic problem, which is present to a 
greater or a lesser extend in the countries of the Balkan peninsula. After  1989, 
the “minority problem” was part of the political reforms that governments had to 
meet. The solution for them consists in an effort in parallel and in continuation 
of the efforts from the times of central planning systems, meaning adjustments 
into a new era of civil democratization, enforcement of parliamentary systems and 
civil liberties. The particularities of each country, led the problem either to its 
11. Miall, 1993, p. 22.
12. Price, 1998, p. 261.
13. Kipas, 2004, p. 513.
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gradual absorption of the shocks, or to greater aggravation with unpredictable 
final consequences. What gives a striking impression is that the institutions of the 
previous system are used for the transition process towards the market economy, 
and what is also of interest is the essential difference between the parliamentary 
system, or in general the civil democracy which is being created, in relation to the 
structure and function of institutions of the previous social system. It is worth 
giving a very quick view of these new elements and even seeing the characteristics 
of the new market economy in these particular countries, at least in the first years 
of reform.
In Romania national independence was pumped by nationalism, based on the 
pride Romanians felt for the historic ascendants of their society, as quite often 
among the Balkan States. 14 They traced back the history of their country back 
in the Roman Empire, which had established a political guard where today’s 
Romania is, naming the region as Dacia. Romanians believe that the neighboring 
countries including Russia 15 are sons of this Dacian state. They are also proud of 
their eastern cultural tradition and of their language, which made them differ from 
their Slav neighbors. Along these standards, Romanian excellence was cultivated 
by Ceaușescu during his governance. Basically, Romanian nationalism comes 
from a historic fear and hatred for the Russians who always made efforts to siege 
Romanian territories during the 19th and early 20th century. 16 It evolved to a great 
extend in the ‘70’s and ‘80’s after the harassment of Hungarians in Transylvania, 
and the persecution of the few Jews that were left in Romania after World War ii.
In this framework, the Ceaușescu regime developed its politics, and punished 
the critics concerning his practices and leadership. The police exerted huge power 
on the citizens life, and the country had the greatest proportion of secret police 
to population, in Eastern Europe. Ceaușescu organized a stalinistic type of power 
and leadership, developing his own cult to enforce the base of his power. He tried 
to implement what was historically inapplicable, that is, to stop the flow of history 
and identify his name with Romania. Here are two well-known examples 17: first, 
he sought to the politics of urbanization in the framework of which thousands of 
villages had to be razed and complexes of buildings of the industrial-agricultural 
type had to be created to house farmers and workers. Secondly, he razed to the 
ground the historic center of Bucharest, which was considered as the “Paris” of the 
14. Goldman, 1997, p. 268.
15. Ibid., p. 268.
16. Ibid., p. 268.
17. Mourtos, 1994, pp. 647-648.
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Balkans, in order to build his own luxurious palace. With this policy, he sought to 
move 90 % of the urban centers population and reside them in new suburbs and in 
new state flats. His aim was first to destroy every space of passive resistance, mainly 
of the people in the rural areas who wouldn’t be easily controlled, creating in this 
way a concentration camp society. Second, to create a type of citizen that would 
function collectively in the framework of his personal perception of socialism. In 
this way he tried to create a new cultural society constituted by subjects with no 
history. 18
After his overthrow and his execution in 1989, the following government under 
Iliescu, tried to create a new situation with new practices such as the abolition 
of censorship, the approval of non-communist groups or organizations, and the 
free assembly of people. However, the new leadership, showing survivals of the 
old regime, didn’t want to share power with the newly funded parties. So, a kind 
of authoritarianism still existed, which actually was a continuation of the past. 
Independent newspapers had difficulties in purchasing newsprint and to make 
deals of distribution. 19 It is quite impressive that the Front under Iliescu, even after 
it was split, and along with the forces of opposition, didn’t share any differences 
as far as the philosophy of the statute of ownership after 1989 is concerned. After 
the 1990 elections, in which Iliescu won 85 % of the votes, as well as the 1992 
elections, the issues of privatization and the foundation of individual property 
were in the agenda. The only question was the rate of privatization and under 
which government it would occur. We also have accusations from the opposition 
about the authoritarian behavior of the Iliescu government. The easy change from 
one type of ownership to another with no further consequences (apart from 
the Ceaușescu execution), on the members of the old regime which constituted 
the body of the new regime, should be a subject of investigation for the kind of 
societies that were prevalent prior 1989.
Bulgaria had its own minority problem. Characteristic example is that during 
the winter 1984-1985 the government begun a massive campaign for the change 
of names of the Turkish population. 20 This however wasn’t the first effort to 
change the names in order to “bulgarize” or “slavicize” them, there were already 
such attempts in  1912-1913, 1941-1944 and in  1971. 21 What was even more 
important was the fact that this whole effort couldn’t find any justification as there 
18. Ibid., p. 648.
19. Goldman, 1997, p. 279.
20. Todorova, 1992, p. 154.
21. Ibid., p. 155.
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was no special opposition of Turkish population, 9,49 % of the total Bulgarian 
population in 1965, to the regime. 22
The communist party prevailed in Bulgaria right after World War ii. The social 
system of Bulgaria functioned at the framework of republican centralization 
imposed by article 5 of the 1971 Constitution, and didn’t face the violence of the 
Ceaușescu regime. 23 In the Bulgarian constitution the term “planning” concerned 
the whole economy and society as well. The wave of political change carried away 
communist Bulgaria in  1989. Its main characteristic is that in the new era the 
process towards democracy, at least in the first years, was achieved by the very 
same mechanism, which for the last five years gave room for the central planning 
to be implemented, projecting the interests of a strong political group. After 1989 
and during the first years, Bulgaria didn’t manage to keep up with the pace of 
Central and Eastern Europe. In 1992, the government tried to undergo a scheme 
of total liberalization of the market but the results were quite disappointing. 24 
Another crucial element is that, in the  1990 elections, the Communist party, 
transformed into the Bulgarian Socialist party, was the winner, it was, with free 
elections, the most powerful communist party in Eastern Europe after  1989. 
This very same party draws a new constitution adapted to the needs of civil 
parliamentary democracy. 25 In the  1991 election, the opposition, being the 
winner, carried on at a faster pace with the practices of the Bulgarian communist 
party. At the same time the financial situation of the workers worsened.
Yugoslavia brought together Slavic and non-Slavic cultural groups with 
various cultural environments, backgrounds 26, different cultural traditions and 
levels of financial prosperity  27. The State organization was based on five national 
groups with their own unities, called Republics after World War ii. With 
their historical background, in Croatia and Slovenia, the Western perception 
concerning political individuality and the economy were more easily developed 28, 
and, on the contrary, the Turkish supremacy brought little to social and economic 
22. Kentrotis, 1994, p. 327.
23. Ibid., p. 229.
24. Kipas, 2004, p. 108.
25. Kentrotis, 1994.
26. Prior to 1918, the Slovenians, the Croatians and the Bosnians were part of 
Austro-Hungary, while the Serbs and the Montenegrins and the Macedonians were part 
of the Ottoman Empire.
27. Goldman, 1997, p. 299.
28. Ibid., p. 301.
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maturity in the southern Republics. This resulted in different social groups 
having different levels of economic prosperity. Slovenia and Croatia were more 
developed and had a kind of European standard of living, with industrial areas, 
advanced telecom and transport. Serbia had an industrial sector but it was 
primarily an agricultural area with a less modern structure compared to the 
northern Republics 29. Montenegro and Macedonia had a much less developed 
infrastructure due to less financial aid.
All of the Republics had “minorities”, and, after World War  ii, they tried 
to reinforce their societies and to control their territories, inhabited by these 
minorities. Furthermore, of Tito’s industrialization period during the  ‘50’s, 
‘60’s, and  ‘70’s, broadening the gap between the town and the village, tended 
to project internal nationalistic prejudice, and to increase internal conflict. 30 So, 
these internal differences between Northern, Central and Southern Yugoslavia 
got worse due as some areas remained extremely poor after World War ii up to 
the 1980’s. The Krajina in Croatia, the county of Kossovo in the Serbian Republic, 
and Macedonia presented slow economic adjustments and advances compared 
to Slovenia, Croatia and parts of Serbia like Vojvodina and the industrial area 
around Belgrade. The per capita income decreased in these areas. However, Tito 
succeeded in developing a kind of Yugoslavian nation and discouraging the 
centrifugal forces. 31 Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo formed cosmopolitan places 
and were inhabited by people from different places, with different religion and 
language which told themselves Yugoslavian. The Yugoslav Communist Party 
was a unifying power, encouraging unity and faith in national predominance 
and central power.
Everything changed with Slobodan Milošević created a neostalinistic way of 
government 32 and extolled Serbian nationalism leading to schismatic moves in 
Slovenia and Croatia that declared their national independence, or even to wars 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kossovo and even in Krajina, where lived a Serbian 
minority. To understand how naïve or propagandistically intentional are the views 
about civilizations’ conflict, it is quite appropriate to refer to the role of European 
Union, especially Germany, or of the U.S.A. which, due to their economic—
most of all—interests, had a quite opposite stance on the issue of the national 
independence of Croatia and Slovenia. Germany was in favor of the fragmentation 
of Yugoslavia, in contrast to the U.S.A. Under these circumstances, economics 
29. Ibid., p. 302.
30. Ibid., p. 303.
31. Ibid., p. 303.
32. Ibid., p. 306.
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were hampered and the transformation of the market was time consuming. Also, 
the refugee problem from the regional wars created much more difficulties in the 
economy. The climax point was the war of the West in 1999 against new Yugoslavia 
leading thus to the destruction of the industrial infrastructure.
Albania was depending on the Ottoman Empire for centuries, and gained 
its independence at the beginning of the 20th  century. After World War  ii, the 
Albanian Communist party prevailed. The only “minority problem” was the 
Greek minority which went through different phases, according to diplomatic 
relations between the two States. Albania remained a closed economic state, 
internationally isolated as it has broken up its close relations with the Soviet 
Union in the ‘50’s and with China as well after Mao’s death, in the end of 1970’s; 
it became the poorest country in Europe. For decades the predominant figure was 
that of Enver Hoxha (“the Red Sultan”). After his death, with Ramiz Alia as his 
successor, and under the pressure of social unrest, reforms started to take place. 
Alia created a wide range of political liberalization. Despite the persistence of the 
bureaucracy, he broke the monopoly of the Communist state, and in the ‘90’s and 
in the 21st  century Albania became a western type parliamentary republic. The 
opening of the market economy in parallel to political change led, as elsewhere in 
the South Balkan, to economic difficulty, more economic reform was needed; just 
don’t forget that in 1991 most of the Albanians were using oxen, carriages and 
donkeys as a means of transportation. 33
Economic reformation
To understand the process of transition, we must remember some characteristics 
of the centrally planned economic systems as these were developed in Eastern 
Europe. Some basic elements were:
• a hierarchical structure of power,
• central planning,
• commitment on the maximum utilization of resources,
• standardisation of goods and services,
• flexibility over control in prices,
• lack of return on money,
• lack of legal alternative solutions in the already predetermined relationships,
• leading motives which involve planning. 34
33. Ibid., p. 65.
34. Campos & Corricelli, 2002, p. 795.
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The centrally planned societies asked for economic development. The planning 
prior to  1989 favored accumulation concerning structural and technological 
change. Although the mechanization process functioned until the ‘60’s, the first 
crisis appeared with the very late growth in that period. At the same time the 
technological gap with the West began to widen. Two options were possible: 1) 
the creation of major technological advances, or 2) diffusion of technology in 
industries. 35 The Soviet Union leadership went for the first choice, thus leading for 
the development of military technology. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 obliged 
the West to vertically develop technological advances based on computers and 
on energy conservation issues, which didn’t actually happen in Eastern Europe. 36
These facts were of catalytic importance for many economists in the West. 
Additionally, this led to slow down the economic development, and consequently 
caused the great crisis of the ‘80’s and especially in 1989, which carried away the 
so-called actually existing socialism, and the Balkan countries as well. After 1990 
the process towards the market economies started to evolve.
The process of transition for today’s specialists has been connected with 
reformations on the institutional framework of the old systems, into the new 
rationales of political and economic content which corresponds to the new 
framework of parliamentary democracy and the market economy. The state 
mechanism of the old system decisively contributed to the reforms which in most 
cases were made by people of the old regime. What was finally changed? Wasn’t 
only the metamorphosis of the Keynesian-Fordian State, after the two oil crises 
of  1973 and  1979, adjusted to the contemporary needs of the global economy, 
which didn’t follow counter reforms? The privatisation of the public enterprises 
even in the ‘80’s wasn’t based on the so-called flexible enterprises in contrast to 
the colossal monopolistic type enterprises that were dominant till then?
A major difference is the breakdown of a rationale of an economic model 
which didn’t adjust at the proper time, while we have the violent adjustment of 
some countries into the new facts with “shock treatments.” Main characteristic 
examples of this kind of tactic are Russia and Bulgaria. The rhetoric for the 
overthrow of Communistic regimes and their transformation into capitalistic 
systems must have been approved finally.
As far as the Balkans is concerned, the Romanian and the Bulgarian 
economy prior to  1989 were quite similar. Large scale enterprises were 
dominant in both countries: the enterprises occupying 501-5  000  workers 
produced 58,9 % of the output in Bulgaria, whereas enterprises occupying over 
35. Ibid., p. 795.
36. Ibid., p. 796.
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5 000 workers produced 13 % of the output. In Romania, enterprises occupying 
501-5 000 workers produced 60,2 % of output and enterprises occupying more 
than 5  000 workers produced 33,8  % of output. In Albania which was the 
least developed country, enterprises occupying more than  501 and less than 
5 000 workers (these numbers didn’t actually exist) produced 71,6 % of output. 37 
With a simple law which contained reforms against monopoly and in favour of 
competition, reforms started to take place beginning in May  1991 in Bulgaria, 
August  1990 in Romania and December  1995 in Albania. 38 Despite some 
differences the transition models in these countries followed the same pattern. 
Only the economic model of Yugoslavia had a significant deviation in relation 
to the other countries in Eastern Europe, because the reforms had a different 
content; it is quite evident from the kind of social ownership that the Yugoslav 
Communists had chosen.
We underline that the Balkans states because of their idiosyncrasy and 
economic evolution are more adjustable to the model of a developing country 
close to those of Central and Eastern Europe. 39 This evolution may be understood 
by the system of social and class composition which existed before 1989 and by 
the changes after 1989 in the social groups among them. 40 G. Eyal support the fact 
that the new civil class consists of the previous intellectuals and the ex-communist 
technocrat-managerial elite. 41
The inflows of foreign direct investments in the pipeline of changeover 
constitute a significant breakthrough in the effort of constructing the economies 
of the Balkan Peninsula. The international trade is said to underly the foreign 
direct investments of the specific area. 42 By using an econometric model which is 
based on the table of data analysis, we ascertain that both major factors, such as 
the destination, the population, the GDP, and less major factors or special factors 
necessary for the procedure of the changeover, such as the danger, the labour 
cost and the corruption could explain the size of the flows of the foreign direct 
investments to a great extent.
The foreign direct investments could be considered as a significant tool for 
the Balkan countries in order to cover their organizational gaps through the 
37. Mintchev, 2001, p. 115, 117 & 118.
38. Ibid., p. 116, 117 & 119.
39. Dunning, 1993, pp. 230-231.
40. Kipas, 2004, pp. 203-207.
41. Eyal, Szelenyi & Townsley, 1998, pp. 46-55.
42. Janicki & Wuanava, 2004, p. 505-509.
CAHIERS BALKANIQUES
Politique et sociétés à Chypre aujourd’hui240
introduction of new techniques that concern either the management of the 
economy or the management of new technologies. However, in order to gain 
foreign direct investments, a policy and a macroeconomic stability are needed, 
with simultaneous transparent legal regulations in respect of others’ property 
and the profits repatriation. 43 There is a close connection between the flows of 
the foreign direct investments, the economic performance and the extractions. 
The foreign direct investments constitute a special characteristic of the economic 
accomplishment, since they pave the way for the acceleration of growth, the 
technological innovation and the restructuring of the enterprises. 44
Apparently, a similar tax policy is also needed, as the high tax rates for the 
companies benefits decrease the yields of the foreign direct investments and 
discourage the entrance of similar capitals. 45 Parallel to this, foreign direct 
investments are necessary in order to cover the organizational gaps of the 
economies of the specific countries to be, whether they concern the management 
of the economy or the management of the new technologies.
The per capita foreign direct investments in the Western Balkan increased 
from 383 dollars in 1995 to 3.839 dollars in 2008. The rise was much bigger in 
Slovenia which reached up to 7.852  dollars and in Croatia up to 7.002  dollars 
and the smallest one was noted in Albania with 829  dollars, while in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina it was 1.686  dollars, in F.Y.R.O.M., 2.121  dollars and in 
Serbia 2.225 dollars. In the South-Eastern Balkans the per capita foreign direct 
investments increased from 270  dollars in  1995 to 3.458  dollars in  2008. The 
largest part of the foreign direct investments came from European Union 
countries. 46
The weaknesses of the Balkan countries economies came into focus after 
the crisis of  2008: a considerable problem in the productive fabric with the 
subsidence of the primary sector, and a spectacular growth of the services sector, 
simultaneous to the deindustrialization. This fact confirmed the weakness of the 
indigenous production to correspond to the demand. According to the official 
statistics of UNCTAD in 2009, the industry produced in the best-case scenario 
the 23,6 % of the GDP in Romania and in the worst case scenario the 7,7 % in 
Albania in 2008. 47
43. Demekas, Horvath, Ribakova & Wu Yi, 2005.
44. Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay & Zettelmeyer, 2002.
45. Mateev, 2008, p. 9.
46. Babanasis, 2014, p. 82.
47. Makris, 2014, p. 664.
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Finally, most countries of the North Eastern Europe restricted the inflation 
during the period of  2002-2011 in order to conform to the criteria of the 
European Union, with the exception of Serbia and Romania which continued to 
be characterized by a high inflation. They also restricted the budget deficits and 
the public debt to levels that approach the Maastricht criterion. 48
Epilogue
The transition of the Balkan societies towards parliamentary democracy presents 
its own specifications. The extraordinary various cultural elements of the area and 
the problem of minorities shape the special transition from the model of centrally 
planned economy on which the Balkan countries were based before  1989, 
towards the market economy. The economic dynamics of the Balkan economies 
before 1989 play an important part in the readjustment of Balkan societies in the 
new era.
Any development constitutes an outcome of the international environment, 
especially of the great forces which in different ways intervened in the area, 
because of the important geopolitical position of the Balkans. We must stress that 
the theory of civilization’s conflict cannot at any rate explain the developments 
that took place in the area the last fifteen years.
The fact that a brief and concise study couldn’t interpret the co-existence of 
different ethnicities and comprehend the content of democracy in the Balkan 
region is quite important. The problem of the co-existence of populations that 
differed both in cultural heritage, national feeling and economic and social 
inequalities is not a new one. None indigenous or trade-oriented middle class was 
bounded to create political institutions a for democratic governments.
It is clear that the countries of the developed capitalism handle the Balkan 
States in a special way because of their geopolitical position on the road towards 
Russia and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the institutions of the former system 
were used in the transition to market economy and civil democracy. In any case, 
any development is also a consequence of the national environment and of the 
Great Powers that commingled in this area in many ways, and the theory circa 
clash of cultures cannot interpret any developments of the last fifteen years. 
The transition to the market economy of the Balkan countries is connected to a 
procedure of reconsideration in Europe, which is related to participation in the 
European Union, that is to say, the embodiment of the Balkan economies in the 
global economy, mainly through the trade and the capital flows.
48. Babanasis, 2014, p. 84.
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In that respect, the creation of high technological breakthroughs and the 
diffusion of technology in the industries is of main importance. The foreign 
direct investments play a major role for this development, and consequently, the 
national trade. The foreign direct investments must be considered as a significant 
tool for the Balkan countries in order to cover their organizational gaps through 
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Abstract: After the collapse of the centrally planned economies in 
Southeastern Europe, the new governments that came to power tried to create 
institutions capable of meeting the needs of new era and the imperatives of 
the neoliberal economy. They had to face the nationalist logic that penetrated 
the Balkan populations, similar to that of other parts of the world, such as 
Africa and Asia, or even in Europe such as Catalonia or the Basque struggle. 
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A special study is required to understand the problems that have arisen in the 
Balkan region, such as population shifts, urban modernization after four decades 
of “existing socialism” with the particular characteristics of that era. It is also 
important to analyze the major socioeconomic developments that have taken 
place in the Balkan countries since 1989.
Keywords: Balkan peoples, nationalism, religion, resistance, institutions, 
democratization, economic reformation, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia
Résumé : après l’effondrement des économies planifiées du Sud‑Est européen, 
les nouveaux gouvernements au pouvoir durent créer des institutions capables de 
répondre aux besoins de l’ère nouvelle et aux impératifs de l’économie libérale. Ils 
durent faire face au courant nationaliste qui pénétra les Balkans, comme d’autres 
parties du monde, Afrique ou Asie, ou même en Europe, au Pays basque ou en 
Catalogne. Une étude spécifique est nécessaire pour comprendre les problèmes qui 
ont surgi dans les Balkans, comme les déplacements de population, la modernisation 
urbaine après quatre décennies de «  socialisme réel  » avec les caractères de cette 
ère nouvelle. Il est aussi important d’analyser les développements socioéconomiques 
majeurs survenus dans les pays balkaniques depuis 1989.
Mots‑clefs : populations balkaniques, nationalisme, religion, résistance, 
institutions, démocratisation, réforme économique, Roumanie, Bulgarie, Yougoslavie
Περίληψη: Μετά την κατάρρευση των προγραμματισμένων οικονομιών της 
Νοτιοανατολικής Ευρώπης, οι νέες κυβερνήσεις έπρεπε να δημιουργήσουν θεσμούς 
ικανούς να ικανοποιήσουν τις ανάγκες της νέας εποχής και τις επιταγές της φιλελεύθερης 
οικονομίας. Έπρεπε να αντιμετωπίσουν το εθνικιστικό ρεύμα που διείσδυσε τα Βαλκάνια, 
όπως και σε άλλα μέρη του κόσμου, την Αφρική ή την Ασία ή ακόμα και την Ευρώπη, τους 
Βάσκους ή την Καταλονία. Ωστόσο, απαιτείται μια ειδική μελέτη για να κατανοηθούν 
τα προβλήματα που έχουν προκύψει στα Βαλκάνια, όπως οι μετακινήσεις πληθυσμών, ο 
εκσυγχρονισμός των πόλεων μετά από τέσσερις δεκαετίες «πραγματικού σοσιαλισμού» 
με τους χαρακτήρες αυτής της νέας εποχής. Είναι επίσης σημαντικό να αναλυθούν οι 
σημαντικές κοινωνικο‑οικονομικές εξελίξεις που σημειώθηκαν στις Βαλκανικές χώρες 
από το 1989.
Λέξεις‑κλειδιά: Βαλκανικοί πληθυσμοί, εθνικισμός, θρησκεία, αντίσταση, θεσμοί, 
εκδημοκρατισμός, οικονομική μεταρρύθμιση, Ρουμανία, Βουλγαρία, Γιουγκοσλαβία
Anahtar kelimeler: Balkan nüfusu, milliyetçilik, din, direniş, kurumlar, 
demokratikleşme, ekonomik reform, Romanya, Bulgaristan, Yugoslavya
Клучни зборови: Балканското население, национализмот, религијата, 
отпорот, институциите, демократизацијата, економските реформи, 
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